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ABSTRACT 
In this article, I argue that to combat the over-delegation of power 
to military tribunals, some limiting principles must exist to prevent 
prejudiced and unwarranted second-chance prosecutions. The United 
States’ criminal justice system purports to embrace sturdy protections 
against double jeopardy, meaning no person shall be tried twice for the same 
offense. Yet, this ideal is far from the reality. In a legal system governed by 
various, distinct sovereigns, prosecutors often have two, or more, 
opportunities to try a case. The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 
this reality in Gamble v. United States,1 which left service members 
particularly vulnerable to successive prosecutions in military courts.  
This degradation of protection against repeated prosecution 
requires intervention from the Department of Defense (DOD). In this 
article, I seek to demonstrate that under the current system, double jeopardy 
exposure is a compounding threat to service member’s legal rights. 
Consequently, this article proposes several limiting principles to minimize 
the use of successive prosecutions and enhance protections for service 
members during court-martial proceedings. Collective confidence in the 
legal system demands that when a service member’s liberty is on the line, 
every precaution be taken to protect against unjust and imbalanced 
successive trials. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Austin Greening, a twenty-four-year-old freshly enlisted sailor, saw 
an unfortunate and devastating mistake propel him down a hole of endless 
litigation, characterized by multiple guilty pleas and calculated tactics meant 
to keep him imprisoned for an extended time across multiple jurisdictions.2 
Greening was tried and convicted in Virginia state court for the accidental 
death of a fellow sailor.3 New evidence was introduced before sentencing, 
so Greening was tried again, entered a guilty plea for voluntary 
                                                           
1 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). 
2 See generally United States v. Greening, No. 201700040, 2018 WL 1547779 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2018). See also Joseph Darius Jaafari, Do Soldiers Face ‘Double 
Jeopardy’ in Military Courts?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 30, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/04/30/do-soldiers-face-double-jeopardy-in-
military-courts [https://perma.cc/S2K2-3RRK]. 
3 See Brock Vergakis, After State Trial and Prison Time, Military Judge Sends Norfolk Sailor 
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manslaughter, and served a six-month sentence.4 The victim’s family and 
the Navy were unsatisfied with this sentence.5 To atone for what they 
believed to be an overly lenient sentence, the Navy opted to charge 
Greening with murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ).6 Thus, once Greening was released from civilian prison, he was 
immediately placed in the brig7 to await his next trial.8 If convicted, Greening 
might have faced life in prison on military murder charges.9 Instead, he was 
sentenced to another three and a half years in military prison.10 To a layman, 
this might appear, on its face, a clear violation of the prohibition against 
double jeopardy, but legal technicalities deem it perfectly permissible. 
While this is certainly an unsettling loophole, it is one the U.S. Supreme 
Court continues to uphold. This article will explore this unique exception 
to traditional conceptions of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
A fundamental precept to the notion of American liberty is that no 
person shall be tried twice for the same offense.11 Yet, in a complex 
federalism system, this seemingly simple sentiment is far too good to be 
true. In a legal system governed by various, distinct sovereigns, the old 
maxim that prosecutors only get one bite at the apple is little more than 
folklore. While the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the false narrative 
around double jeopardy in Gamble v. United States,12 it left a glaring and 
often forgotten hole in its analysis: successive trials under the military justice 
system. 
Since the passage of the Articles of War in 1776, Congress sought 
to insulate military courts from civilian control, noting that military justice is 
virtually inseparable from military discipline—a wholly distinct entity from 
civilian courts.13 At America’s founding, a system permitting a service 
member to be tried by both court-martial and a state criminal court for the 
same criminal act, let alone nonmilitary criminal conduct, could not possibly 
have been fathomed. The post-World War II expansion of military 
                                                           
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *2 (detailing steps taken by Greening’s command to 
extend Greening’s active duty status to keep him within UCMJ jurisdiction). 
7 A brig is a temporary place of confinement—akin to a jail cell—where Navy sailors or Marines 
are placed when accused of a crime. See, e.g., Austin Rooney, In the Slammer: Special 
Programs, Brig Duty, ALL HANDS (Jan. 9, 2018), https://allhands.navy.mil/Stories/Display-
Story/Article/1840462/in-the-slammer/ [https://perma.cc/5C75-99XJ].  
8 Vergakis, supra note 3. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
12 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019) (holding that prosecution by a separate sovereign is not 
considered a prosecution for the “same offence” and, therefore, does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
13 See JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE 3 (1992). 
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authority to try service members for civilian crimes undermines the 
congressional intent of Article I, which provides Congress with the ability to 
make rules governing the armed forces and for trying military cases.14 The 
implications of this expansion of power have been largely ignored, allowing 
the military unfettered authority to retry service members by court-martial 
for offenses receiving an unsatisfactory result in state court. Left unchecked, 
this power severely limits the rights of active duty, reserve, and retired 
members of the armed forces. 
In Gamble, the Supreme Court upheld the separate sovereigns 
doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,15 thereby 
perpetuating a legal loophole undermining the individual liberties of its 
citizens—particularly service members of the armed forces. This article first 
analyzes the historical development of the Fifth Amendment’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause and separate sovereigns doctrine during the preratification 
founding of the American military justice system.16 Next, it provides an 
overview of the Court’s reasoning for upholding the separate sovereigns 
doctrine in Gamble, as well as the counterarguments from Justices Ginsburg 
and Gorsuch who called for its invalidation.17 In analyzing these criticisms, I 
seek to explore the evolution of these principles from their origination to 
their modern practice, particularly through the lens of military justice. 
Consequently, this article will argue that the Court’s decision in Gamble fails 
to recognize the unique implications arising from successive prosecutions in 
military courts, which effectively authorizes a compounded loss of service 
members’ rights.18 I argue that to combat the over-delegation of power to 
military tribunals, some limiting principle must exist to prevent prejudiced 
and unwarranted second bites at the apple by partial adjudicators.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This part provides context for the siloed development of both the 
separate sovereigns doctrine and the origins of military justice. It first 
discusses the evolution of double jeopardy jurisprudence and the 
establishment of the separate sovereigns doctrine—a doctrine developed in 
                                                           
14 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 936–73 
(2015). 
15 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1976. 
16 See infra part II. 
 
17 See infra part III.  
 
18 See infra part IV.  
 
19 See infra part V. 
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a counter-textual fashion in light of the Fifth Amendment’s construction and 
congressional intent. It then explores the independent development of the 
military justice system and early exploration of double jeopardy principles 
within the framework of separate sovereignty. 
A. Fifth Amendment 
The text of the Fifth Amendment reads: “No person shall . . . be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”20 
The traditional understanding of the notion that individuals should be free 
from multiple prosecutions for the same offense has a long and storied 
history.21 As Justice Hugo Black noted, “[f]ear and abhorrence of 
governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the 
oldest ideas found in western civilization.”22 Colonial enactments, 
established prior to the passage of the Fifth Amendment, either fully 
incorporated the rights, liberties, and immunities afforded to the subjects of 
England—which included a prohibition against double jeopardy—or 
established their own provisions precluding it.23 These early enactments 
were often codified into state law prohibitions prior to the formal adoption 
of the Fifth Amendment in 1791.24  
While the text of the constitutional amendment provides a 
seemingly comprehensible understanding of the strictures and dictates of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, there has been substantial debate about the 
practical application of the clause. Early modern jurisprudence on the 
matter has indicated the important place double jeopardy has on the 
contemporary practice of law. For example, in Green v. United States, the 
Court, in dicta, offered:  
[T] he constitutional prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’ 
was designed to protect an individual from being subjected 
to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than 
once for an alleged offense. . . . [T]he State with all its 
resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense.25 
                                                           
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
21 See David S. Rudenstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against 
Double Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 197–99 (2005). 
22 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
23 Maryland, Massachusetts, and Connecticut all adopted some form of prohibition against 
double jeopardy in their colonial enactments. See Rudenstein, supra note 21, at 221–22. 
24 The states that codified prohibitions against double jeopardy through case law, statute, or 
constitutional amendment included New Hampshire, New York, Virginia, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Rudenstein, supra note 21, at 223–26. 
25 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
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According to this understanding, such actions on behalf of the State are 
“contrary to both the letter and spirit” of the clause.26 
Alternatively, uncertainty over the meaning and parameters of the 
clause results from questions as to whether the protections from double 
jeopardy intend to defend individuals from cumulative punishment or the 
harassment of multiple trials.27 This uncertainty and lack of uniformity 
between early decisions and modern interpretations led to inconsistent 
holdings where successive prosecutions have become paramount issues.28  
Despite the commanding language of the Fifth Amendment, there 
is a long-recognized exception to the double jeopardy prohibition: the 
separate sovereigns doctrine. Essentially, the nature of federalism mandates 
that states and the federal government exist in separate, mutually exclusive 
spheres.29 Yet, one of the foundational debates during the ratification period 
was whether the states and the federal government were to be considered a 
hybrid-sovereign system or, alternatively, part of “one whole.”30 Ultimately, 
the prevailing argument was that, while states were considered exclusive in 
their own right, it was equally important that separate sovereignty 
incorporate a “balance between the national and State governments . . . [to] 
form a double security for the people.”31 
This security breaks down where schemes form and evolve in ways 
that were inconceivable pre- and early post-ratification. For example, 
concurrent criminal statutes disrupt the distribution of authority between 
the federal and state governments.32 This concept raises peripheral 
questions as to the ability of the federal system to balance rights.33 However, 
this problem is not limited to a federal-state overlay.34 A unique and often 
overlooked area where concurrent jurisdiction poses similar complications 
is between state or federal jurisdiction and the military justice system’s 
jurisdiction. 
                                                           
26 Id. at 198. 
27 See LEONARD G. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6 (1968). 
28 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A 
Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183, 1197–99 (2004) (explaining historical 
inconsistencies in interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
29 See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 53, 60–61 (1987). 
30 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
31 See BERGER, supra note 29, at 63. 
32 Because of the Supremacy Clause, concurrent state statutes tend to be preempted by 
federal laws—particularly where concurrent jurisdiction is at issue. See Joshua M. Devine, 
Statutory Federalism and Criminal Law, 106 VA. L. REV. 127, 144 (2020). 
33 See MILLER, supra note 27, at 5. 
34 This issue was considered most acute where the conduct offended multiple systems or laws, 
which created concurrent problems among the jurisdictions. See Comment, Twice in 
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 264 (1965). 
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B.  Origination of Military Justice 
The presence of military court-martial proceedings predates the 
discovery of the Americas.35 From the “Court of Chivalry” to the “Articles 
of War,” there has long been an understanding that crimes committed by 
soldiers were subject to military jurisdiction.36 These authorities inspired the 
American colonies to propagate their versions of the Articles of War.37 
While concerned with the impending revolution, the philosophical 
viewpoints shaping the construction of these Articles focused more squarely 
on building a functional military justice system with mechanisms to control 
and discipline members within its ranks.38 
In its earliest days of development, the military justice system 
oscillated between civilian principles, constitutional values, and culturally 
ingrained military structures.39 As a result, unique procedures and 
punishments arose for discipline-specific violations.40 However, this system 
was not settled with an eye toward expanding a military tribunal’s jurisdiction 
over conventional crimes.41 Rather, questions surrounding civilian 
supervisory capacity over these proceedings raised additional issues 
regarding the role of military tribunals.42 While boundaries between the 
military justice system and its civilian counterpart do exist, it is firmly 
established that military courts both derive power independent of their 
civilian counterparts and that their authority arises from the Constitution 
itself.43 
This section analyzes the foundational origins of military justice and 
military courts. It then seeks to elaborate upon the innate distinctions 
between military and civilian courts. Next, this section assesses the pivotal 
role Grafton v. United States played in early common law conceptions of 
                                                           
35 Lt. Col. J.D. Droddy, USAF (Ret.), King Richard to Solorio: The Historical and 
Constitutional Bases for Court-Martial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases, 30 A.F. L. REV. 91, 92 
(1989). 
36 See id. at 91–95 (listing historical jurisdiction expectations of military members). 
37 Id. at 95–96. 
38 See LURIE, supra note 13, at 3. 
39 See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military 
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 654 (2003). 
40 Additional procedures in place allow for nonjudicial punishment through mechanisms like 
administrative boards, summary courts-martial, and bad-conduct discharges for specific, 
service-related charges. See id. at 713.  
41 Id. Specifically, Turley critiqued the collateral areas in which the military justice system has 
taken over governance. Id. at 661–62. One such area concerns what he calls “troubling 
questions of both the necessity and legitimacy of military jurisdiction.” Id. at 654. 
42 See LURIE, supra note 13, at 6. 
43 Capt. Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court’s Role in Defining the Jurisdiction of Military 
Tribunals: A Study, Critique, & Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10 
(2005). 
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the separate sovereigns doctrine—specifically in the military context.44 
Finally, it provides an overview of the substantial expansion of military court 
jurisdiction and the implications that expansion has had on successive 
prosecutions. 
1.  Foundational Roots 
During the foundational days of the American nation, then 
Commander in Chief, George Washington, called for revisions to the 
Articles of War, originally crafted by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.45 
By 1776, Congress established what became known as the military court-
martial.46 In fact, the processes governing court-martial practice already 
underwent several revisions prior to the ratification of the United States 
Constitution.47 While the system was well-established by the time the 
Constitution was ratified, the use of the court-martial was limited by the 
government’s constitutional authority to convene them.48 
The constitutional authority to create the pre-existing military 
courts is arguably derived from two distinct sources in the Constitution: (1) 
Article I, Section Eight, Clause Fourteen;49 and (2) Article II, Section Two, 
Clause One.50 While ascertaining exactly where the constitutional authority 
for military courts originates is difficult, it certainly does not fall within the 
ambit of Article III.51 
Despite their establishment under the authority of the federal 
system through the ratification of the Constitution, very little about the 
                                                           
44 206 U.S. 333 (1907). 
45 See LURIE, supra note 13, at 4–5. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. The original revisions to the 1775 Articles of War—as they were known at the time—
were prompted by then-General George Washington who considered them insufficient. Id. 
at 4–5. The 1776 revisions were the first in a series of revisions that established the military 
court-martial and outlined due process considerations within the framework of military 
discipline. Id. at 5–6. Finally, Congress adopted procedural changes in 1786, just before 
ratification of the Constitution, that included cross-examination and a Court of Inquiry. Id. 
at 8–9. 
48 See Baldrate, supra note 43, at 10. 
49 See id. This Article gives Congress the power “to make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14). 
50 See id. at 12. Article II provides power to the President as an independent authority to 
agglomerate all military trials and tribunals. It makes the President the “Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States,” and, therefore, court-martial are to be 
considered a tool to assist Presidents in their constitutional capacity to maintain good order 
and discipline within the forces. Id. at 12 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). 
51 See id. at 6–7, 14. This is important because the Constitution requires that Article III courts 
hear all cases and controversies, thereby limiting the jurisdiction of military courts, which do 
not garner the same constitutional respect as other courts. Id. at 14–15. 
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Articles of War changed during the nation’s early years.52 Some material 
changes occurred following major wars, with the greatest revisions taking 
place after World War II, including the formation of the UCMJ and 
Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).53 This modification to the Articles of 
War served as a catalyst for the modern expansion of military justice 
jurisdiction.54 It is this expansion, in particular, that has further blurred the 
line between the military and civilian systems of justice. 
2. Separation from the Civilian System 
The United States Supreme Court accepts that the military system 
is a “separate community” with limited overlap with the typical functioning 
of the civilian justice system.55 Indeed, from conception, both Thomas 
Jefferson and John Adams intended and supported a system of military 
justice that was “admittedly severe” based on the principle that “governance 
of the military was based on needs very different from those of a civilian 
polity.”56 Adams’s notion of military justice as a lone entity, separate and 
distinct from civilian proceedings, reinforced much of the early decision-
making about congressional interference with military justice practice.57 
There was an inherent perception of danger in the idea of military 
encroachment into civil and political rights; therefore, the sharp separation 
of the two was necessary to preclude such a threat.58 General William 
Tecumseh Sherman, head of the Army following the Civil War, recognized 
the danger of allowing civilian laws and values to seep into the governance 
of military justice.59 He argued that contaminating military law with civilian 
principles would ultimately threaten and “weaken” military culture as a 
whole,60 though the same precept operates in reverse as well. 
                                                           
52 See Droddy, supra note 35, at 98–99. 
53 See id. at 99–100. The UCMJ and MCM were both created through an Executive Order 
issued by President Harry Truman in 1951. Particularly, the MCM sought to “clarif[y] the 
customary relationship between military articles and the civil law.” Id. at 100 (citing Exec. 
Order No. 10,214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (Feb. 8, 1951)). 
54 See id. at 98–99. 
55 James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen’s 
Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 177–78 (1984). 
56 See LURIE, supra note 13, at 5. Here, an analysis of a handful of the framers’ intentions in 
drafting a Constitution where the military system was wholly distinct provides context for 
perceptions of the time. Id. at 5. This sets the framework to understand how the system 
developed. 
57 Id. at 6. 
58 Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article III, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
305, 331 (2015). 
59 See Turley, supra note 39, at 651. 
60 See id. at 651–52. This vision was supported by the Supreme Court at the time as well. Id. 
at 652. 
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“Procedural informalities” deemed permissible in military tribunals 
would otherwise be considered insufficient in typical civilian courts.61 These 
informalities, which carried over from common law edicts of military 
justice,62 provide fodder for the argument that civilian legal concepts 
remained outside the purview of military jurisdiction.  
3. Grafton v. United States 
This section shifts to an overview of the civilian conception of 
successive prosecution and its place in military justice jurisprudence. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Grafton, while consistent with early common 
law conceptions of separate sovereignty, stood in contrast to a line of then-
recently decided cases that altered the jurisprudential tides away from a 
general fear of successive prosecutions.63 Rather than ignoring widely 
recognized doctrines governing the prohibition against successive 
prosecutions by dissimilar sovereigns, Grafton distinguishes that, where 
offenses are similar in “substantial respect” and have already been tried in a 
competent jurisdiction, subsequent trials serve no utility and may be 
discarded.64 
Grafton involved the court-martial of a service member in the 
Philippines for murder.65 The soldier was acquitted and subsequently 
retried in a local court for the same offense.66 The second trial resulted in a 
guilty verdict and a sentence of twelve years and a day.67 Grafton argued 
before the Supreme Court that his Fifth Amendment right to be free from 
double jeopardy was violated, which led the Court to reverse the 
conviction.68 In so finding, the Court reasoned: 
[W]e rest our decision . . . upon the broad ground that the 
same acts constituting a crime against the United States 
cannot, after the acquittal or conviction of the accused in a 
court of competent jurisdiction, be made the basis of a 
second trial of the accused for that crime in the same or in 
another court, civil or military of the same government.69 
                                                           
61 Margulies, supra note 58, at 335. 
62 Such informalities initially included the lack of counsel for the defendant. Furthermore, 
there were fewer mechanisms to temper harsh punishments. Id. at 335. 
63 See generally Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13 (1852); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560 
(1850); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847). 
64 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 355 (1907). 
65 Id. at 333. 
66 See LURIE, supra note 13, at 79 (citing Grafton, 206 U.S. at 351–52). 
67 See id. (citing Grafton, 206 U.S. at 344). 
68 See id. (citing Grafton, 206 U.S. at 345). 
69 Grafton, 206 U.S. at 352. 
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This holding rests on the general notion that prohibiting double jeopardy, 
through the Constitution or an act of Congress in civilian courts, must apply 
equally to court-martial proceedings—a comparably competent 
jurisdiction.70 
4. Expansion of Jurisdictional Power 
Modern developments in the UCMJ expanded the jurisdiction of 
military courts to permit the prosecution of nearly all crimes committed by 
service members—in their civilian capacity or otherwise.71 This expansion 
usurped the idea that the military justice system was primarily focused on 
maintaining discipline and order and instead allowed Congress, through its 
plenary power over the military, to extend criminal subject-matter 
jurisdiction to military courts over both common law and statutorily defined 
felonies.72 
Previously, the Court ruled in O’Callahan v. Parker that service 
members could not be tried by court-martial for non-service-related 
offenses.73 The Court, in handing down this decision, provided: 
A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of 
justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part 
of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is 
preserved . . . . But the justification for such a system rests 
on the special needs of the military, and history teaches that 
expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain 
carries with it a threat to liberty . . . . “There are dangers 
lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided 
by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution.”74 
However, this understanding of the jurisdictional limitations inherent to 
court-martial proceedings was shortly abolished in Solorio v. United States,75 
which extended the scope of charges that could be brought against military 
personnel, including those without a direct link to military discipline.76 The 
abolition of the distinction between service-connected crimes and non-
                                                           
70 See id. (holding that where an individual is tried for an offense in any court that derives its 
authority from the United States—regardless of conviction or acquittal—that individual may 
not be tried again for that same offense). 
71 Note, Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1910 (1991). 
72 Id. at 1914–16. This expansion was temporarily curbed in O’Callahan v. Parker, wherein 
the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding military courts’ ability to handle the 
“subtleties of constitutional law.” Id. at 1916 (quoting 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969)). 
73 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969). 
74 Id. at 265 (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955)). 
75 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
76 See Margulies, supra note 58, at 341. 
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service-connected offenses was predicated upon the belief that doing so 
“was a futile enterprise” and difficult to administer in practice.77 
This expansion broke down the dividing line between military and 
civilian courts, allowing military courts to procure greater power in deciding 
cases. Not only was the expansion codified in the UCMJ and MCM, 
through defined criminal articles, it was also enshrined in Article 134 (the 
General Article),78 which allowed for the assimilation of state laws and 
permitted the prosecution of such offenses under federal law.79 This rapidly 
expanded the power and jurisdiction of court-martial proceedings to reach 
crimes and offenses that never would have been fathomed by the 
Constitutional framers during the early days of the nation. 
The robust expansion of the military justice system and its 
jurisdictional capacity has opened the door to lengthy debates about the 
fairness and veracity of the process. This substantial jurisdictional overlap, 
compounded with newly emerging understandings of double jeopardy’s 
relation to separate sovereignty, led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari 
in Gamble v. United States in 2018. 
III. GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES 
The Supreme Court heard arguments in Gamble v. United States 
in December 2018 and announced its decision in June 2019.80 Rather than 
upend the present conception of “offence” and dual sovereignty, the Court 
found in favor of preserving the status quo—permitting continued successive 
prosecutions in state and federal courts.81 This part provides an overview of 
the Court’s decision, beginning with a brief recitation Gamble’s facts and 
procedural history. The next section analyzes the majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Alito, and discusses the majority’s rationale for 
preserving the separate sovereigns doctrine as it relates to double jeopardy. 
Then, the subsequent section briefly surveys Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion expressing his reservations about the use of stare decisis as a general 
principle of judicial decision-making. The final section of this part examines 
Justice Ginsburg’s and Justice Gorsuch’s separate dissents, which this article 
expands upon in subsequent parts.82 
                                                           
77 See id. at 342. 
78 19 U.S.C. § 934, art. 134 (2018). 
79 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). 
80 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). 
81 Id. at 1980. 
82 See infra part III. 
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A.  Facts 
As the adage goes, “if you want something done right, do it 
yourself.” This logic drove federal prosecutors to indict Terance Martez 
Gamble for a felon-in-possession offense despite his guilty plea to a similar 
charge in Alabama state court.83 In November 2015, an Alabama police 
officer pulled Gamble over for a damaged headlight before the officer 
allegedly detected the odor of marijuana permeating from Gamble’s 
vehicle.84 Having established probable cause to search the vehicle, the officer 
uncovered a loaded 9-mm handgun.85 Gamble had a prior second-degree 
robbery conviction, which prohibited him from possessing a firearm under 
both Alabama and federal law.86 The subsequent federal prosecution was 
authorized by the long-standing doctrine permitting prosecutions by 
different sovereigns—in this case, state and federal—and, thereby, did not 
implicate double jeopardy concerns.87 
B.  Procedural History 
Gamble believed he was being charged twice for the same act.88 He 
moved to dismiss the federal indictment on the grounds that it was brought 
for “the same offense” for which he had already been convicted in an 
Alabama state court.89 Gamble argued that the federal indictment violated 
his constitutional protection against double jeopardy.90 
The federal district court denied his motion to dismiss based on 
precedent indicating two offenses are not considered the “same offense” if 
they are prosecuted on behalf of different sovereigns.91 Following the district 
court’s denial, Gamble plead guilty to the federal felon-in-possession 
offense, but he preserved the double jeopardy challenge for appeal.92 The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal—approving the conviction on separate 
                                                           
83 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. Alabama code specifically provided that “no one convicted of a ‘crime of violence’ ‘shall 
own a firearm or have one in his or her possession.’” Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a) 
(2015)). The corresponding federal law—criminalizing the same act as a separate “offense”—
prohibits those convicted of some felony-level offenses from “ship[ping] or transport[ing] in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition.” 18.U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). 
87 The rationale, espoused by earlier courts, noted that prosecution for two offenses (one 
under federal law and one under state law) necessarily implicated two distinct offenses 




91 Id. (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985)). 
92 Id. 
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sovereignty grounds.93 Gamble then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which granted certiorari to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause 
forbids successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns.94 
C.  Opinion of the Court 
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and 
Kavanaugh joined.95 In affirming the Eleventh Circuit decision, the Court 
determined “[e]liminating the dual-sovereignty rule . . . would not even 
prevent many successive state and federal prosecutions” derived from the 
same criminal act so long as they are defined by statutory elements.96 
Justice Alito began by extrapolating whether the Court should 
overrule the long-standing separate sovereigns doctrine of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause—specifically noting the complexity of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence.97 Ultimately, Justice Alito pointed to three seminal cases to 
ground his separate sovereign, separate-interest argument, leading to his 
conclusion that the “duality of harm explains how ‘one act’ could constitute 
‘two offences, for each of which [the offender] is justly punishable.’”98 
In crafting a historical analysis of the “170 years of precedent” on 
double jeopardy, Justice Alito cabined his inquiry to avoid the founding-era 
conception of the right to protection from double jeopardy.99 Rather, he 
focused on the doctrinal development presented in three seminal cases: Fox 
v. Ohio,100 United States v. Marigold,101 and Moore v. Illinois.102 These cases, 
Justice Alito asserted, spell out the foundational principles of the separate 
sovereigns doctrine.103  
First, Fox held that the class of crime and its impact on public safety 
might require separate and distinct prosecutions.104 As a corollary to this 
understanding, Marigold contemplated that “the same act might, as to its 
character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an 
offence against both state and federal governments,” thus permitting 
                                                           
93 Id. In Gamble, the Court used the verbiage “dual-sovereignty” doctrine. For the purposes 
of this article, the terms dual-sovereignty and separate sovereignty are interchangeable. 
94 Id. at 1964–65. 
95 Id. at 1960. 
96 Id. at 1980. 
97 Id. at 1963–64. 
98 Id. at 1967 (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 (1852)). 
99 Id. at 1964. Gamble focused the majority of his argument on original conceptions of double 
jeopardy and English common law perceptions regarding the right. 
100 46 U.S. 410 (1847). 
101 50 U.S. 560 (1850). 
102 55 U.S. 13 (1852). 
103 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1966. 
104 Id. (citing Fox, 46 U.S. at 435). 
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separate penalties to attach from both entities.105 This notion was expanded 
further in Moore, where the Court outlined the purported legal distinction 
between the “the same act” and “the same offence.”106 Abstractly, the Court 
stated a single act could be the source of the violation of the law (an offense) 
of two separate sovereigns, making the singular act punishable by both.107 
The Court then argued that the standard derived from these cases 
was firmly cemented in its United States v. Lanza decision.108 In Lanza, the 
Court held that an act designated “as a crime by both national and state 
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be 
punished by each.”109 Justice Alito and the Court found that Gamble’s 
original intent early common law argument could not overcome the weight 
of stare decisis.110 It expressly rejected the conception that incorporating the 
Double Jeopardy Clause against the States effectively abrogates the 
application of the separate sovereigns doctrine.111 Instead, the Court held 
that a broad dual-sovereignty doctrine continued to exist as a backdrop to 
Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence, despite the incorporation of the 
Fifth Amendment.112 
Finally, Justice Alito expressed that eliminating the separate 
sovereign doctrine would not narrow the reach of federal criminal law, nor 
would it fundamentally alter the legal conception of “offence” for double 
jeopardy purposes.113 Overturning this long-standing doctrine would require 
the Court to ignore stare decisis and undergo a revolutionary recalculation 
of federalism and basic criminal conduct principles.114 
D.  Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the result but writing 
separately to address his view on the veracity and proper application of stare 
                                                           
105 See id. (quoting Marigold, 50 U.S. at 569). 
106 See id. (citing Moore, 55 U.S. at 14). 
107 Moore, 55 U.S. at 20. The Gamble Court further extrapolated that “[a]n assault on a 
United States marshal . . . would offend against the Nation and a State” by “‘hindering’ the 
‘execution of legal process,’ and the second by ‘breach[ing]’ the ‘peace of the State.’” 
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1966–67 (quoting Moore, 55 U.S. at 20). 
108 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
109 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967 (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382). This argument rests on the 
distinction between “the people of a State” and “the people of all the States,” even though 
each derives its power from the same source: the people. Id. at 1999 n.26 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
110 Id. at 1978. 
111 This is expressly argued to combat the analogy to the silver-platter doctrine in the Fourth 
Amendment, which aptly applies to the separate sovereignty exception to the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1978–79. 
112 See id. at 1979. 
113 See id. at 1980. 
114 See id. 
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decisis.115 He agreed with Justice Alito that the historical record of the 
separate sovereignty doctrine did not justify overhauling the settled 
exception.116 However, Justice Thomas asserted the Court’s reliance on stare 
decisis did not comport with Article III because it justified the supremacy 
of clearly erroneous decisions over the literal text of the Constitution and 
federal statutory law.117 Justice Thomas’s concern involved the movement 
toward federal common law, under the guise of stare decisis, and away from 
the three bodies of federal positive law: “the Constitution; federal statutes, 
rules, and regulations; and treaties.”118 He asserted that interpreting the law 
as a judicial duty requires “adherence to the original meaning of the text,” 
and not a blind adherence to demonstrably erroneous precedent.119  
E.  Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion. Her overarching 
concern was that the majority permitted Gamble’s liberty to be depleted 
based on a “metaphysical subtlety” known as the separate sovereigns 
doctrine.120 Justice Ginsburg asserted that the focus on English common law 
to ascertain whether foreign judgments would bar successive state or federal 
prosecutions was misguided.121 Instead, the focus should have been on the 
basic tenants of the construction of the federal system itself: those of a 
“compound republic.”122 
Justice Ginsburg maintained that the precedent relied upon by the 
majority to uphold the existence of the separate sovereigns doctrine was 
derived from outdated dicta.123 Furthermore, she stressed that stare decisis 
should not command when a case “concern[s] procedural rules that 
                                                           
115 Id. at 1980–81 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
116 Id. at 1980 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting, there will always be a “tempt[ation] for judges 
to confuse [their] own preferences with the requirements of the law” (citing Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 687 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting))). 
118 See id. at 1980–84 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 1989 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas still concluded Gamble failed to 
establish that the separate sovereignty doctrine was incorrect or demonstrably erroneous.  
120 Id. at 1989 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. at 1990–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A compound republic, as Justice Ginsburg posits, 
connotes the delegation of authority between the federal government and the States was 
intended to serve as “double security [for] the rights of the people”—the true sovereigns. See 
id. at 1991 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
123 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1991 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg specifically noted 
early American courts disfavored successive prosecutions, even where calling upon 
“separate” Federal and State sovereigns. See id. at 1992 (citing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 
1, 15 (1820)). 
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implicate fundamental constitutional protections.”124 Specifically, she 
pointed to several limiting principles suggesting the “unjust” purposes of 
successive prosecutions are well recognized in the legal community.125 
F.  Justice Gorsuch’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion expressing concerns 
about the Court’s willingness to readily endorse a massive exception to the 
prohibition against double jeopardy.126 He posited that the Court endorsed 
a system where “if all the might of one ‘sovereign’ cannot succeed against 
the presumptively free individual, another may insist on the chance to try 
again.”127 Justice Gorsuch traced his rationale for the complete abrogation of 
the separate sovereigns doctrine to the historical practices of ancient times, 
including the Greeks, Romans, Old Testament, and early days of common 
law.128 Furthermore, he argued that the government proffered no evidence 
to suggest the framers intended “same offence” to have a “lawyerly 
sovereign-specific meaning.”129 
To illustrate his historical analysis, Justice Gorsuch relied heavily 
on court-martial proceedings within the military justice context.130 This 
                                                           
124 Id. at 1993 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 
n.5 (2013)). 
125 Id. at 1992, 1995 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg pointed to the DOJ’s use of 
its Petite policy to reduce the number of offenses it tries that are “based on substantially the 
same act(s) or transaction(s)” as conduct previously tried in state courts, limiting federal 
prosecution to cases that left a “substantial federal interest . . . demonstrably unvindicated.” 
Id. at 1995 (quoting DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-2.031(A) (rev. July 2009)). 
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg drew on the fact that over half of the States prohibit successive 
prosecution for offenses previously resolved in either state or federal courts. Id. (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
126 Id. at 1996 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. Justice Gorsuch points to these three historical periods as key sources in the 
development of American government and law. First, Justice Gorsuch notes that the law in 
ancient Athens established that “man could not be tried twice for the same offense.” Id. 
(citing ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS 195 (1927)). 
Next, the Old Testament teachings also supported this bar to the practice of double jeopardy. 
Id. (citing ZACHARY NUGENT BROOKE & CHRISTOPHER N. L. BROOKE, THE ENGLISH 
CHURCH AND THE PAPACY 204–05 n.1 (1931)). Last, early common law stated that to 
“‘punish a man twice over for one offence’ would be deeply unjust.” Id. (quoting 1 FREDRICK 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448 (2d ed. 
1898)). 
129 Id. at 1998 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Gorsuch points to the fact that, 
in 1786, a congressional committee promoted federal authority over import duties so as to 
prevent “thirteen separate authorities” from “ordain[ing] various penalties for the same 
offence.” Id. (quoting 30 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789, at 440 (J. 
Fitzpatrick ed. 1934)). 
130 Id. at 1998, 2003–04. First, Justice Gorsuch points to a Continental Congress resolution 
from 1778, which declared no person can be tried in state court “for the same offense, for 
17
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illustration added fodder to his argument that, upon adoption of the Fifth 
Amendment in 1791, a multiplicity of common law authorities supported 
the convention that “a prosecution in any court, so long as the court had 
jurisdiction over the offense, was enough to bar future re-prosecution in 
another court.”131 Justice Gorsuch took issue with the Court’s reliance on 
stare decisis, while it wholly ignored the Constitution “as originally adopted 
and understood,” to prohibit successive federal and state prosecutions.132 He 
argued that the early nineteenth century cases precipitating the separate 
sovereigns doctrine were decided by narrow margins.133 Ultimately, Justice 
Gorsuch concluded there is no doubt that “the benefits the framers saw in 
prohibiting double prosecutions remain real, and maybe more vital than 
ever, today.”134 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Gamble reaffirmed a misguided line of modern precedent that 
indiscriminately followed stare decisis rationales. Such blind adherence 
solidified a major loss for the individual rights of everyday Americans and, 
more specifically, the rights of American service members. As the appellate 
defense divisions of the various service branches argued in their amicus 
brief, “the separate-sovereigns exception not only allows another bite at the 
apple after a state trial: it slices the apple into ‘bite sized’ pieces for the 
government,” by allowing military prosecutors to effectively alter the final 
verdict of a state court jury.135 Early proponents of the separate sovereigns 
doctrine likely could not have anticipated such a scenario. This construction 
allows the orders of legally unqualified commanders to abrogate a service 
                                                           
which he had previous thereto been tried by a Court Martial,” and vice versa. Id. at 1998 
(quoting 10 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789, at 72 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934)). 
Justice Gorsuch also refers to an early, foundational case, Houston v. Moore, to establish 
that where there is concurrent jurisdiction between courts “the sentence of either Court, 
either of conviction or acquittal, might be [later] pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the 
other.” Id. at 2004 (quoting Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 31 (1820)). 
131 Id. at 2000 (emphasis in original). 
132 See id. at 2005. 
133 See id. at 2007. Justice Gorsuch stressed that Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United 
States were decided by 5-to-4 and 6-to-3 margins, respectively. See 359 U.S. 121 (1959); 359 
U.S. 187 (1959). He then argued this precedent was eroded by subsequent decisions of the 
Court. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 2007 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784, 793 (1969)). 
134 Id. at 2009. Where governments may utilize multiple prosecutions “it is ‘the poor and the 
weak,’ and the unpopular and controversial, who suffer first.” Id. (quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. 
at 163 (Black, J., dissenting)). 
135 Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Defense Division et al. as Amici Curia 
Supporting Petitioner at 2, Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (No. 17-646) 
[hereinafter Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps]. 
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member’s liberty.136 Where a commander seeks their own preferred charges 
as a second avenue towards so-called justice, Gamble now affirms that he or 
she may effectively circumvent the prior state or federal jury 
determination.137 This affirmation is particularly concerning because 
deference to the jury’s factfinding role is a bedrock principle of the 
American legal system.138 There is no legitimate proposition upon which the 
separate sovereigns doctrine, permitting successive prosecutions through a 
court-martial, should be tolerated. The overlap between state and military 
systems are minimal and, to some degree, anachronistic.139 As such, this 
development has dangerous implications for service members who find 
themselves charged with crimes in state or federal courts. 
This part will first examine the prudential development of the 
military court-martial system, its double jeopardy understanding, and its 
interaction with the civilian judicial system. Next, this part will analyze the 
pragmatic dangers of successive prosecutions in military courts, resulting 
from the structural dissimilarities inherent in the military justice scheme. 
Furthermore, I argue that by allowing the separate sovereigns doctrine to 
apply in court-martial proceedings, service members face a compounded 
loss of rights that is detrimental to broader notions of justice and liberty. 
Finally, this part analyzes the negative impact this doctrine has on individual 
service members through the posture of Greening—a recent Navy court-
martial proceeding that doubled the accused’s sentence through the 
weaponization of the double jeopardy exception to the detriment of the 
sailor’s liberty and security.140  
A.  Understanding the Framers’ Intent 
As noted above, the isolation of the military justice system was 
intentional. The founders believed the governance of the military required 
radically different standards than those of civil society.141 “[T]his concern 
                                                           
136 See Jaafari, supra note 2 (explaining that the military commanders in charge of court-
martial proceedings often have little or no legal background or training and lack ethical 
oversight akin to a state or military bar). 
137 Of particular concern is the fact that many military judges have asserted that the armed 
forces have a protected interest in trying those cases where a state court has handed down a 
sentence that it considers improper or overly lenient. They also claim that victims’ families 
are vindicated through successive court-martial proceedings because they “ensur[e] justice is 
served.” Id. 
138 Harold P. Weinberger, Norman C. Simon, and Samantha V. Ettari, Kramer Levin Naftalis 
& Frankel LLP, Civil Jury Trials (Federal), WESTLAW PRACTICAL L. (2019), File. No. w-020-
5711. 
139 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 4. 
140 See generally No. 201700040, 2018 WL 1547779 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2018). 
141 I am analyzing framer’s intent not because they were great expositors of individuals’ rights 
and liberties at the time they drafted the Constitution, but to provide a comprehensive 
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and its attendant preferences continues to the present day.”142 Original 
understandings of common law court-martial jurisdiction were intended to 
be incredibly narrow and did not permit jurisdiction over offenses against 
civilians without some military nexus—which invariably prevented instances 
of double jeopardy.143 It was not until 1863, nearly a century after the 
enactment of the Articles of War, that Congress permitted court-martial 
proceedings against “soldiers, in wartime, for civil crimes.”144 At that time, it 
was universally understood there was no utility in trying a service member 
for a civil crime where a competent state or federal court had jurisdiction to 
do so.145 
1.  English Common Law & the Constitutional Convention 
The United States brand of military justice was structured to parallel 
many of the practices and principles ingrained in English common law. In 
particular, the writings of Blackstone served as a source of inspiration as to 
the structural understanding of military court-martial proceedings.146 
Blackstone’s commentaries stated that “[t]he necessity of order and 
discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance.”147 He 
expounded that: 
This discretionary power of the court martial is indeed to 
be guided by the directions of the crown; which, with 
regard to military offences, has almost an absolute 
legislative power. “His majesty,” says the act, “may form 
articles of war, and constitute courts martial, with power to 
try any crime by such articles, and inflict penalties by 
sentence or judgment of the same.” A vast and most 
important trust! an unlimited power to create crimes, and 
annex to them any punishments, not extending to life or 
limb! These are indeed forbidden to be inflicted, except 
for crimes declared to be so punishable by this act; which 
crimes we have just enumerated, and among which we may 
                                                           
understanding of the original interplay between the separate military justice complex and 
double jeopardy conceptions. There is little doubt this doctrine has developed and evolved 
along with modern society, which I seek to address in later sections of this article.  
142 See LURIE, supra note 13, at 4. 
143 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 29. 
144 See id. at 30 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23 n.42 (1957)) (emphasis omitted). 
145 See id. 
146 See Margulies, supra note 58, at 332. 
147 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS 
*413 (1753), http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2140/Blackstone_1387-01_EBk_v6.0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A2HK-8NTT]. 
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observe that any disobedience to lawful commands is 
one.148 
Quite aptly, Blackstone noted his concerns related to the broad expansion 
of the military courts’ power to try a comprehensive range of cases.149 It is 
this skepticism that informed the framers in fashioning a similar system in 
the emerging nation.150 
The English system recognized the importance of housing the 
armed forces under Parliament—the functional equivalent of Congress—and 
the value in allowing that body to determine what could be tried by court-
martial.151 In replicating this structure, the United States Congress housed 
the power to regulate the armed forces under Clause Fourteen.152 Though 
the framers were less concerned with the individual rights and liberties of 
American service members,153 it is unlikely they contemplated service 
members being subject to double jeopardy without concern.  
Early discussions surrounding the origin of the Fifth Amendment’s 
language led to a debate as to whether to include certain phrasing to clarify 
the meaning of “same offense.”154 Congressmember George Partridge, Jr.155 
proposed the inclusion of the phrase “by any law of the United States,”  
though this language was omitted from the final text and did not indicate the 
general mindset of the congressional populace at the time of its 
conception.156 
Furthermore, notes from the Continental Congress recognized that: 
[N]o person shall be tried in any Court of Judicature for 
the same offence, for which he had previous thereto been 
tried by a Court Martial; or be arrested or called to trial by 
a Court Martial for any offense not expressly made 
                                                           
148 Id. at *415–16. 
149 Id. at *417. 
150 Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries 
and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1195, 1219 (Mar. 2014) (“The text is consistent with English commentary at the time 
of the adoption of the Bill of Rights; Blackstone argued against greater jurisdiction for the 
military courts and emphasized that they should be used only at times of war for order and 
discipline in the army.”). 
151 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 766 (1996). 
152 Id. at 767. 
153 See LURIE, supra note 13, at 3. 
154 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1789). 
155 Representative George Partridge, Jr. served as an officer and minuteman during the 
Revolutionary War in addition to holding his position as a delegate in the House of 
Representatives for the state of Massachusetts. The First Federal Congress: Representative 
George Partridge, GEO. WASH. UNIV., 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p1/members/reps/ partridge.html 
[https://perma.cc/2HET-YALJ] (last visited Nov. 22, 2019), 
156 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1789). 
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cognizable before them, or for which the offender may be 
under arrest, indictment or imprisonment by a civil 
authority.157 
There can be no more explicit recognition that, though early conceptions 
of the military justice system did not advocate for the full swath of protected 
liberties for service members, protections against double jeopardy were of 
paramount importance from the start. Through discovery and 
development, these protected liberties became more widely recognized. 
Now, any abdication of these protections is an affront to the military justice 
system's purpose as a whole. 
2.  Differentiating Military Courts as Article I Courts 
The military justice system, in its general capacity, is granted the 
ability to exercise jurisdiction over a broad array of criminal cases, as 
permitted by Article I of the Constitution.158 Article I, Section Eight, Clause 
Fourteen of the Constitution, which grants plenary powers to Congress “[t]o 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces,” permits trying a service member through court-martial proceedings 
solely based on the accused’s status as a military member.159 
Examinations into the administration of court-martial proceedings 
indicate, at common law, these proceedings were not intended to exercise 
judicial power in the same manner as civilian courts because they are 
inherently creatures of the military.160 As Colonel Frederick Wiener argued, 
military justice must be malleable to accommodate the liberty and due 
process interests afforded to civilian defendants while simultaneously 
allowing for the capacity to “respond to the needs of military command and 
control.”161 Thus, while governed by a different article (congressional control 
through Article I), the protections afforded to civilian defendants should not 
be depleted in the military context. 
B.  Successive Prosecutions in Military Courts 
Despite the practice of discrete separation between civilian and 
military proceedings, recent developments have integrated the systems to 
permit the unjust expansion of successive prosecutions and “rob[] the old 
                                                           
157 10 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789, at 72 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934)). 
158 See ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34697, SUPREME COURT APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION OVER MILITARY COURT CASES (2009). 
159 Solorio v. U.S., 483 U.S. 435, 438 (1987). 
160 James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and Judicial Power of the United 
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 754 (2004). 
161 See id. at 755 (citing Frederick Bernays Wiener, American Military Law in the Light of the 
First Mutiny Act’s Tricentennial, 126 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (1989)). 
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rule of significan[ce].”162 Because court-martial jurisdiction has become 
“even more expansive than the general federal criminal jurisdiction,” it has 
provided military prosecutors unfettered authority to bring cases against 
military members under the cover of the UCMJ, even if a trial has already 
concluded in state or federal court.163 Not only does this support a complete 
degradation of the protections against double jeopardy for service members, 
it also impermissibly expands the separate sovereigns doctrine to 
incorporate a jurisdiction never intended to hold the same degree of 
authority. 
1. Use in Practice 
Poor regulations characterize the management of court-martial 
jurisdiction over criminal acts involving the same general offenses that were 
previously brought in state courts.164 This practice is a particularly vexing 
issue as none of the military branches keep records regarding previously 
tried civilian cases.165 Because there is “no military-wide regulation restricting 
the ability of military convening authorities,” senior-ranking officers, 
typically with little to no legal training, are tasked with “conven[ing] a 
successive court-martial.”166 As a result, the subsequent trials of service 
members previously tried in state or federal courts fly under the radar 
without significant scrutiny. 
The Departments of the Army and the Air Force do not keep 
records of how often they conduct successive court-martial proceedings, but 
the Navy has consistently held approximately two per year.167 The deficiency 
in the records suggests an indifference on behalf of the military branches 
that is quite disturbing considering the gravity of the liberty interest at stake 
when service members are subject to successive proceedings—court-martial 
or otherwise. However, those in favor of successive court-martial 
proceedings contend there are other limiting mechanisms to prevent 
rampant abuse by government prosecutors.  
One purported mechanism arises in Blockburger v. United 
States,168 where the Court developed a test (the Blockburger test) to be 
                                                           
162 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 32 (citing Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)). 
163 Id. at 31–33. 
164 Id. at 5. See also Jaafari, supra note 2. 
165 See Jaafari, supra note 2 (“It’s unclear how often the military tries service members on 
charges already adjudicated in civilian courts.”). 
166 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 5 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 82 
(1985)). 
167 See id. at 6–7. 
168 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
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applied where two similar statutes govern the same conduct.169 The 
Blockburger test is a pseudo-limiting mechanism applying in all contexts 
where there may be successive prosecutions.170 It requires that, where the 
transaction results from two statutory provisions, they must each require 
proof of a separate and distinct element.171 Where a single act violates 
multiple statutes, and each requires additional facts, the accused is not 
exempt from prosecution or punishment under both statutes.172  
The intention of the Blockburger test was to prevent prosecutors 
from continuously trying a defendant by charging lesser included offenses 
until they finally secured a conviction.173 However, the separate sovereigns 
doctrine, coupled with the good order and discipline provision, has had the 
opposite effect in the military context.174 Because so many UCMJ crimes 
mandate the crime also be prejudicial to good order and discipline or bring 
disrepute upon the armed forces, it is easy to meet the requirements of the 
Blockburger test.175 
An article within the UCMJ proscribes the ability to try an accused 
a second time for the same offense, but the statute is internally facing.176 
Despite this structure, safeguards to protect against the abuse of successive 
trials in a military context are severely limited. The Department of Defense 
(DOD) does not have a procedure akin to the Petite Policy issued by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to limit when use of successive prosecution is 
appropriate.177 In contrast, the DOJ explicitly calls for the sparing use of 
successive prosecutions as a general rule in civilian courts.178 The DOJ Petite 
policy specifically states: 
In order to insure the most efficient use of law enforcement 
resources, whenever a matter involves overlapping federal 
and state jurisdiction, federal prosecutors should, as soon 
                                                           
169 Id. at 304. However, scholars have noted that the Blockburger test does not necessarily 
stand for the principle of “sameness” that has often been attributed to it by various courts. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 943 YALE FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 
SERIES 1807, 1807 n.3 (1997). 
170 See Poulin, supra note 28, at 1213. 
171Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
172 Id. 
173 See Maj. Daniel J. Everett, Double, Double Toil and Trouble: An Invitation for Regaining 
Double Jeopardy Symmetry in Courts-Martial, ARMY L. 6, 13 (2011). 
174 Id.  
175 See e.g., Droddy, supra note 35, at 95. 
176 “Internally facing” refers to the idea that the prohibition against successive prosecutions, 
as outlined in the UCMJ, means that there may not be two court-martial proceedings for the 
same offense, referred to as Former Jeopardy. 10 U.S.C. § 844, art. 44 (2019). 
177 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 15–16. 
178 ADAM HARRIS KURLAND, SUCCESSIVE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: THE DUAL 
SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 3–4 
(2001). 
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as possible, consult with their state counterparts to 
determine the most appropriate single forum in which to 
proceed to satisfy the substantial federal and state interests 
involved, and, if possible, to resolve all criminal liability for 
the acts in question.179 
The policy effectively and substantially curtails the number of successive 
cases brought between traditional federal and state courts. However, because 
there is no parallel provision recognized by the DOD, no authority governs 
a military prosecutor’s discretion to bring or bar successive court-martial 
proceedings. A system devoid of such oversight creates a perfect situation for 
abuse by those who wish to use military tribunals to take a second bite at the 
apple.  
2. Article 134 & Assimilation 
Another mechanism providing a practical loophole to the “same 
offense” bar is Article 134 of the UCMJ—otherwise known as the “general 
article.” Article 134 functions as a catch-all provision to try crimes not 
otherwise articulated.180 Pragmatically, it provides another avenue to 
distinguish common federal or state crimes from those separately triable by 
government prosecutors during court-martial proceedings.  
The purpose behind Article 134 is to capture “all disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces” 
and to encompass all conduct that could bring discredit upon the armed 
forces.181 This conception harkens back to the idea that an offense tried by 
military tribunals should have some military-applicable component tied to 
it.182 Following the recent revision to the UCMJ in 2018, an even greater 
array of crimes may fall within the ambit of those “garden-variety crimes” 
that are apt to have duplicative state court trials.183 This revision is 
particularly dangerous in light of the “heightened degree of state and military 
cooperation” of late.184 
The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act (FACA) is a facet of Article 
134, permitting the military prosecution of a state crime if it could be 
                                                           
179 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
2000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals [https://perma.cc/L6QJ-
UNMK]. 
180 10 U.S.C. § 934, art. 134 (2019). 
181 Id. 
182 See e.g., LURIE, supra note 13, at 6. 
183 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 32. 
184 “Military criminal investigators typically work very closely with state investigators when 
crimes involve both jurisdictions.” See id. at 33 (quoting Maj. Charles L. Prichard, Jr., The 
Pit and the Pendulum: Why the Military Must Change its Policy Regarding Successive State-
Military Prosecutions, 414 ARMY LAW. 1, 16 (2007)). 
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charged through the FACA.185 This Act sidesteps the Blockburger issue by 
incorporating the “prejudice of good order and discipline” and the 
“bring[ing] discredit upon the armed forces” elements to satisfy conviction 
under Article 134.186 
Because the military and state often have concurrent jurisdiction 
over land where a base is settled, a person who commits an offense on that 
land may open him or herself up to vulnerabilities of prosecution, both from 
the state court and military court-martial proceedings. In other words, a 
person who commits an offense on that land may open him or herself up 
to vulnerabilities of dual prosecutions if the crime is subject to assimilation 
under the FACA. The only difference—though of utmost importance under 
Blockburger—between the two trials would be the incorporation of the 
“good order and discipline” and the “to bring discredit upon the armed 
forces” provisions of the general article.187 Any suggestion that this satisfies 
the Blockburger test and does not implicate a double jeopardy violation 
requires an act of mental gymnastics. This language effectively provides a 
workaround to allow military tribunals to bring a broader range of charges 
in court-martial proceedings without offending the Blockburger test or the 
Fifth Amendment. 
C.  Compounding Effect of Loss of Rights 
Not only is there a sense of unease in the ability to try an individual 
twice for the same general offense in a military court-martial, but these trials 
also have a compounding effect that may lead to a greater loss of individual 
rights. Due in large part to early conceptions regarding the military justice 
system’s sole purpose of maintaining discipline within the ranks, as opposed 
to adjudicating civil crimes, certain general rights and protections are 
conspicuously absent from military trials.188 This section outlines a few of the 
key safeguards forming the cornerstone of the traditional civilian trial that 
are absent in the military context. The section will argue that this provides 
fertile ground for successive prosecution to deplete the bundle of rights that 
are generally afforded to criminal defendants. By stripping these safeguards, 
defendants are left with limited protective rights when hauled before a 
military tribunal. 
                                                           
185 See HENNING, supra note 158. See also 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2020). 
186 See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2020). 
187 Under the FACA, state law is applicable to conduct occurring on federal land. See id. 
However, through the inclusion of the “good order and discipline” and “to bring discredit 
upon the armed forces” elements of Article 134, a state law could be construed as a separate, 
federal offense that could be separately tried. See 10 U.S.C. 934 (1950). 
188 See, e.g., LURIE, supra note 13, at 6. 
26
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss1/6
188 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
1. Lack of Impartiality 
Generally, adjudicators are presumed to be impartial and apolitical 
to ensure their decision is both fair and unbiased.189 However, because court-
martial proceedings fall squarely outside the strictures imposed on Article 
III adjudicators, there is no guarantee of impartiality in the routine 
dispensation of justice. 
Where a person is tried in a successive trial for the same offense, it 
is dangerous to haul him or her before an adjudicator who has no mandate 
to remain impartial like an Article III judge.190 The punitive consequences 
are akin to those of the prior prosecution in state court; therefore, there is 
no decreased risk to offset the eroded protections. Compounding matters, 
the military judiciary is dependent on the executive and Congress; therefore, 
those who adjudicate these matters cannot be considered impartial decision-
makers.191 
Military judges are not siloed from politics and partiality in the same 
way civilian court judges are; they are still subject to promotion and 
command influence.192 With such incentives looming over their heads, 
military judges may be tempted to overlook procedural protections for 
defendants in an effort to please superiors and convening authorities.193 It is 
entirely conceivable these superiors may desire to bring a successive 
prosecution and direct a verdict in contravention of what justice would 
require.194 This danger increases tenfold where a defendant was acquitted in 
state court, yet both Congress and military command believe justice has not 
been served. In such cases, Congress and command may determine that the 
accused need to be retried in a different arena to vindicate their 
preconceived perceptions of justice. 
2. Jury of Peers Versus Ranking Members 
In the military, a jury of your peers representative of the community 
does not hold the same meaning as it does in a civilian court. In a court-
martial proceeding, the jury (otherwise known as a “panel”) is comprised of 
senior ranking officers.195 The convening authority is not required to 
                                                           
189 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
493, 498 (2014).  
190 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 11–12. 
191 See Military Justice and Article III, supra note 71, at 1918–19. 
192 See id. at 1920–21. 
193 See id.  
194 See id. 
195 See Jaafari, supra note 2. 
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“detail”196 a representative panel by demographics or rank but are, instead, 
governed by the strictures of 10 U.S.C. § 825.197 This distinction fosters a 
strong, hierarchical power disparity that can act to the detriment of the 
service member being tried.198 
Alternatively, traditional state and federal defendants are ensured a 
fundamental constitutional “selection of a petit jury from a representative 
cross section of the community.”199 Without this protection, arbitrary power 
could be used to conspire against and disserve marginalized and 
disadvantaged defendants by depriving them of liberty and subjecting them 
to unfair successive prosecutions.200 
3. Lack of Unanimity 
Finally, there is no requirement in court-martial proceedings that 
the panel returns a unanimous verdict, regardless of the offense charged.201 
This unsettling diminution of jury protections gives rise to serious concerns 
as to the justice of such convictions.202 
For example, the separate sovereigns doctrine permitted the retrial 
of Private Seth Lemasters after he was acquitted in a Virginia state court.203 
The subsequent conviction resulted in a ten-year sentence, in no small part 
because the panel was not required to return a unanimous verdict to achieve 
a conviction.204 Essentially, the military is afforded a preview of the strengths 
and weaknesses of a case as it proceeded in state court before bringing 
effectively the same case in a court-martial proceeding, one where the bar 
for conviction is substantially lower. In what alternate universe could this 
have been the intention in crafting these separate adjudicatory systems? 
                                                           
196 The term “detail” typically means to form or convene a temporary, ad hoc group of service 
members for a particular mission. Therefore, a group detailed to a court-martial panel is 
tasked with the mission of dispensing justice. See Glossary, OFFICE OF MILITARY COMM’N, 
https://www.mc.mil/LEGALRESOURCES/Glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/P4TB-
WRQK]. 
197 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2018). The principal strictures require that a defendant who is a 
commissioned officer be tried by a panel of commissioned officers. Id. Enlisted defendants, 
for their part, may not be tried by members of their own unit or by a panel with fewer than 
one-third enlisted members, of which none may be junior in rank to the defendant. Id. 
198 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 7–8. 
199 See id. at 11 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975)). 
200 See id.; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 698 (1975). 
201 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 8–9. 
202 See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 936. 
203 Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 11–12 (citing United States v. 
Lemasters, No. 20111143, 2013 WL 6913001, at *1–2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 31, 2013)). 
204 Id. at 13. 
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D. United States v. Greening 
The poignant example of Austin Greening throws the dangers of 
court-martial proceedings into sharp relief. Austin Greening, a former sailor 
for the United States Naval forces, was loading and unloading firearms in 
his apartment in the presence of his friend and fellow sailor, Gunner’s Mate 
Third Class (GM3) K.K.205 While GM3 K.K. was attempting to hand 
Greening one of the loaded pistols, Greening accidentally allowed the pistol 
to discharge, and a round subsequently struck GM3 K.K. just below his left 
eye, killing him.206 Greening was charged with murder in a Virginia state 
court in 2013.207 
During his initial civilian proceeding in August 2013, Greening was 
indicted for second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission 
of a felony.208 He was initially convicted of both crimes but was later retried 
upon discovery that the Commonwealth’s medical examiner disclosed 
erroneous information to the court, bringing into question the veracity of 
the original conviction.209 Thereafter, Greening entered into a plea 
agreement where he plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter, accepting a 
sentence of three years of confinement with two years, six months 
suspended.210 Ultimately, Greening served seven weeks in jail before being 
released on September 9, 2015.211 The very next day, Greening was taken 
into pretrial confinement by naval authorities, and court-martial charges 
were proffered two weeks later.212 
Throughout his civilian trial, Greening’s command continued to 
send him Administrative Marks, informing him that he would be 
“voluntarily” extended beyond his scheduled service due to his prospective 
court-martial proceedings.213 Upon release from civilian confinement, naval 
commanders proffered charges against Greening for murder under the 
UCMJ.214 
Greening was then tried by a military judge, by general court-
martial, who convicted him of involuntary manslaughter and obstruction of 
justice in violation of Articles 119 and 134 of the UCMJ.215 He was sentenced 
                                                           
205 See United States v. Greening, No. 201700040, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Mar. 30, 2018). See also Jaafari, supra note 2. 
206 See Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1. 
207 See Jaafari, supra note 2. 
208 Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32, 18.2-53.1 (2018)). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 See id.; Jaafari, supra note 2. 
212 Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1 n.6 (2018). 
213 Id. at *2. 
214 See Jaafari, supra note 2. 
215 Greening, 2018 WL 1547779, at *1. 
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to forty-two months of confinement, subject to reduced pay, and a 
dishonorable discharge.216 
On appeal, Greening proffered two arguments: (1) the government 
lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to untimely action in releasing 
him from active duty and (2) the Navy violated his Fifth Amendment due 
process rights by failing to provide notice that he was being held 
involuntarily on active duty.217 Ultimately, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed the court-martial findings and sentence.218 
Not only does this result add to the litany of unjust precedent 
permitting the stripping of service members’ rights, but it also sanctions their 
unconstitutional, successive prosecutions.219 Attorneys from various service 
branches filed appeals against the government during the review of this case 
to advocate for the principle that “those who serve[] our country receive the 
proper double jeopardy protections of the Constitution,” which they note is 
the “basic charter of rights to which they took an oath to defend with their 
lives.”220 How can service members risk their lives to defend a Constitution 
that takes no strides to protect their own? 
V.  IMPLEMENTATION OF LIMITING PRINCIPLES 
In light of the compounding effect on the loss of rights that service 
members subjected to successive prosecutions face, this part seeks to offer 
a handful of limiting principles to reduce and eliminate the use of military 
tribunals as a workaround to better-postured prosecutions. Even though 
Gamble permits the application of the separate sovereigns doctrine to the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, these limitations can help ensure military 
members do not find themselves helpless in the face of an unjust and 
historically improvident decision.  
First, I argue for the implementation of a military-specific Petite 
Policy to govern the appropriate use of successive prosecutions and to 
provide much-needed DOD oversight. A Petite Policy would establish 
guidelines as to which cases the DOD could reasonably permit a successive 
prosecution predicated on substantially the same act as the first.221 Second, 
I argue for enhanced restrictions on the use of the general article in bringing 
                                                           
216 Id. 
217 Id. at *3–4. 
218 Id. at *5. 
219 See Jaafari, supra note 2. 
220 Id. As Greg T. Rinckey—former Army judge advocate and founding partner of Tully 
Rinckey firm—aptly stated, “It smells bad . . . It smells like double jeopardy.” Id. 
221 Presently, DOJ prosecutors look to the Petite Policy to guide their decision as to whether 
to bring a federal case against a defendant for substantially the same act prosecuted in state 
court. Though there is no statutory bar precluding federal prosecutors from calling for a 
successive prosecution, the DOJ places a self-imposed restraint on bringing such cases unless 
a “substantial federal interest” needs vindication. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 179. 
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successive prosecutions. Finally, I implore the military justice system to seek 
alternatives to this practice and increase its standards to prevent unfettered 
abuse to the detriment of military justice, military discipline, and the 
American legal system as a whole.  
A. Formation of a Department of Defense “Petite” Policy 
This section provides an insight into the benefits of adopting a 
military-specific Petite Policy that could dictate under what conditions, if 
ever, it would be appropriate to permit a successive prosecution through 
court-martial proceedings. This Petite Policy would mirror the DOJ’s 
policy, which requires a careful examination of the utility in trying an 
individual again, in a different forum, for effectively the same offense.222 Not 
only would this practice require the DOD to apply greater scrutiny to its 
generally permissive view of supplemental military jurisdiction subsequent 
to a state court proceeding, but it would also provide clear guidelines to 
ensure just outcomes are achieved in the greatest number of cases. 
1.  DOD Oversight of Successive Prosecutions 
The first step in reconstructing the military justice system requires 
implementing a strategy like the DOJ’s Petite Policy. This policy would 
prescribe administrative limitations on what cases, and in what context, the 
separate branches could choose to pursue successive prosecution. 
If the policy seeks to mirror the DOJ policy, it would need to 
prevent the initiation or continuation of court-martial proceedings where the 
act in question was “substantially the same act or transaction” as the act 
already adjudicated in state or federal court, unless the prior proceeding left 
a “substantial [military-specific] interest [] unvindicated.”223 As with the DOJ 
version, the DOD would be required to pursue a calculated comparison of 
the factual scenarios, bringing the offense under the domain of each 
respective jurisdiction. This would ensure any decision to move forward on 
a previously tried case would be grounded on careful, case-by-case 
considerations, an analysis that accounts for the fundamental utility and 
fairness of multiple prosecutions. 
2.  Proposed Requirements 
I propose the factors established in the DOJ policy be incorporated 
into routine practice for military tribunals. Specifically, three prerequisites 
must be satisfied. First, the matter must involve a substantial military 
                                                           
222 See id. 
223 See KURLAND, supra note 178, at 5 (citing DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-
2.031(A) (2018)). 
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interest.224 Second, the prior prosecution must have left that interest 
demonstrably unvindicated.225 Third, the government must believe the 
defendant’s conduct constitutes a military-specific offense that is likely to 
result in a conviction based on admissible evidence.226 
Ultimately, such requirements should have a demonstrable impact 
on the present figures associated with the prevalence of successive 
prosecutions.227 Moreover, a military-specific Petite Policy will likely 
decrease the number of proposed successive prosecutions as well.228 This 
degree of oversight, and the clarity gained from adhering to a written policy, 
could further bolster the rights of military service members and help ensure 
they are fully protected from double jeopardy considering the Gamble 
decision. 
B.  Restriction on Use of Article 134 Charges 
By using the separate sovereigns doctrine framework, the military 
code has found a means by which to incorporate a catchall article that may 
also implement state violations into the charging scheme. Since the 
Supreme Court decided Parker v. Levy,229 it has placed limits on the reach 
of Article 134, which requires all charges include actual conduct detrimental 
to “good order and discipline,” though the scope of this provision is still in 
doubt.230 This doubt also manifests in the capacity to abuse successive 
prosecutions and threaten double jeopardy interests. This section seeks to 
limit the use of such an article to strategically minimize service member 
protections against successive prosecution. 
1.  The Guise of Good Order and Discipline 
Practitioners have noted a marked diminution of the good order 
and discipline rationale, which has transformed itself into the quintessential 
“we don’t like something but don’t want to explain why” element.231 No 
standardized definition exists for the term, which has permitted its 
                                                           
224 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 179. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See HENNING, supra note 158, at 1–2 n.2. 
228 The DOJ’s Petite policy requires federal prosecutors to analyze the claim based on three 
substantive prerequisites, and it encourages the use of a single forum, thereby inherently 
reducing the number of proposed successive prosecutions.  See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 179. If the DOD chose to implement a similar policy, then the likely outcome would 
be a reduction in both actual and proposed successive prosecutions.  
229 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
230 Colonel Jeremy S. Weber, USAF, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and 
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widespread abuse by commanders.232 Such abuses have led modern 
Congressional leaders like Senator Kirsten Gillibrand to advocate for 
reforms that remove these commanders from decision-making processes 
that allow them to tout “good order and discipline” as a justification for their 
decisions.233 Specifically, Gillibrand stated to the Washington Post: 
The Defense Department tells us that if 3 percent of the 
most senior commanders don’t have the sole authority to 
decide whether a person accused of rape should be 
prosecuted, we will lose good order and discipline in our 
military. That same argument was used against integrating 
the services; against allowing women to serve; against 
repealing don’t ask, don’t tell; and against allowing women 
in combat. It wasn’t true then, and it isn’t true now.234 
Attempts at reform have proven fruitless in recent decades. But, as 
Gillibrand impliedly supported, there is no evidence that permitting such 
offenses to be heard in civilian courts alone has negatively impacted the 
military's ability to preserve “good order and discipline.”235 
2.  Prohibition on Bringing Successive Article 134 Claims 
Rather than permit the continued expansion of the use of this 
article, the system must be amenable to the Pentagon’s proposed reforms 
to the scope of its use.236 Specifically, there must be an overall prohibition 
on the use of Article 134 in bringing successive prosecutions for crimes 
already tried in state court so as to not offend the double jeopardy 
protections that service members necessarily must retain. 
If a blanket prohibition were imposed, this would require 
government prosecutors to designate the offense in a clear, offense-specific 
article of the UCMJ and MCM. This would ensure the use of a statutorily 
demonstrable standard that the military branches are required to publish 
for members to recognize and understand. Superimposing a federal or state 
offense into the catch-all, Article 134, not only facially suggests that there is 
weak justification in bringing a successive prosecution but also adds a 
military element to an otherwise wholly ordinary offense. This practice 
undermines the legitimacy of the military justice system and can be thwarted 
                                                           
232 One example concerning the abuse of this general article included the court-martial of an 
Army physician for refusing to conduct dermatology training for Special Forces members 
and for making anti-war statements to enlisted members. Thus, the use of the article runs the 
gamut. See id. at 133 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)).  
233 Id. at 167–68 (referring to military members resistance in accepting women’s eligibility to 
serve in combat). 
234 Id. at 169 (quoting Kirsten Gillibrand, Justice for Military Victims of Sexual 
Assault, WASH. POST, May 27, 2016, at A17). 
235 See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 968–69. 
236 See Weber, supra note 230, at 165. 
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early on through a military-specific Petite Policy—particularly, where the 
government is seeking to bring a charge under Article 134. This policy will 
assuredly reduce the number of successive prosecutions and simultaneously 
preserve service members’ double jeopardy protections.  
C.  Increased Standards for Successive Convictions 
While not perfect, the civilian system for limiting the number and 
types of successive prosecutions is a model the military justice system must 
look to in driving back its overuse of such successive prosecutions.237 First, 
the reforms may be balanced against the current use of the civilian Petite 
Policy, limiting the time and capacity in which successive prosecutions 
before distinct sovereigns may be brought.238 
There must also be a diametric shift away from the overexpansion 
of military court-martial jurisdiction to combat this dangerous practice. One 
possible solution would be to return to the system originally conceived by 
the framers,239 providing special solicitude to these tribunals to try military-
specific offenses—not the full gamut of civilian crimes. 
Take the case of Greening, for example. If the DOD had adopted 
a military-specific Petite Policy, DOD officers would have been tasked with 
first identifying a substantial military interest that had been left unvindicated 
in the state court proceeding. In this case, the interest espoused by Naval 
prosecutors appeared to be colored by the victim’s family’s dissatisfaction 
with the length of the state court sentence.240 As a result, it is highly unlikely 
that this rationale would pass muster as a legitimate “substantial military 
interest.” If for some reason DOD officers did find such an interest, officers 
would have been left to determine what interest was left demonstrably 
unvindicated. While there may have been an argument for the forthright 
application of justice due to the divulgence of erroneous information that 
led to a retrial, the retrial that was conducted in state court would appear to 
have directly vindicated this interest. Thus, the second rationale for the 
application would have also fallen short. Finally, DOD officers would then 
have had to fit the act within the framework of a military offense; a simple 
task under the facts in Greening, given that the UCMJ has a specific article 
outlining the elements of murder as well as involuntary manslaughter.241 
Consequently, the third prerequisite would have been easily met—even 
where the first two fell short. Hence, a military-specific Petite Policy would 
likely have entirely prevented the successive prosecution in Greening’s case. 
                                                           
237 See Brief of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps, supra note 135, at 14–16. 
238 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 179. 
239 See Hirschhorn, supra note 55, at 210–13. 
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Furthermore, there is no question that neither murder nor 
involuntary manslaughter are military-specific offenses.242 Competent state 
courts may try them without requiring the military to step on a state court’s 
toes to right a self-declared wrong. Were a limit that pared down the use of 
military courts for nonmilitary-related offenses to be imposed, Greening 
would never have been hauled before the military judge after already serving 
his state-imposed sentence. 
While the military justice system is certainly an important and 
necessary facet of the armed forces, using it to circumvent outcomes in other 
jurisdictions is a complete usurpation of justice. Substantially more just 
outcomes result where civilian courts and military courts remain sufficiently 
separate and successive prosecutions are altogether abandoned. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Gamble—upholding the separate 
sovereigns doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
on stare decisis grounds—may have maintained the modern jurisprudential 
status quo, but it further entrenched a system that continually undermines 
the liberty and protections of military service members.243 While the Court’s 
attempt to play it safe may have little practical impact on traditional civilian 
prosecutions, the same cannot be said for military justice institutions that do 
not have the same type of limiting safeguards. The Court’s refusal to give 
credence to the practical rationales behind the separation of the military 
justice system and the benefits of maintaining some degree of isolation to 
prevent abuse and disruption diminishes the authority and legitimacy of the 
court-martial process in its entirety. The system is fundamentally flawed if it 
permits young men and women to die in a fight to protect a set of 
Constitutional liberties that they themselves are deliberately and specifically 
denied. 
                                                           
242 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1103(a) (2020); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-3-103 (2020); GA. CODE § 16-5-3 (2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(a) (2020); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1 (2020). 
243 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1979–80 (2019). 
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